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479 
THE ART OF STRIPPING: HOW THE GOVERNMENT 
APPLIES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO STRIP YOU OF YOUR 
PROPERTY 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
RICHMOND COUNTY 
 
In re City of New York1 
(decided May 7, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs, Lawrence and Liana Paolella, owners of Staten 
Island property consisting entirely of wetlands, challenged the taking 
of their property that resulted from the implementation of the State of 
New York’s Freshwater Wetlands regulations.2  The property was 
acquired by the City of New York as part of the New Creek Bluebelt 
Phase 4 project.3  These regulations required the Paolella property to 
be left vacant, prohibiting any reasonable productive development of 
the property.4  Plaintiffs brought suit after being denied a permit to 
develop the property due to the enforcement of the State’s Freshwater 
Wetlands regulations.5  In June 2007, the City of New York took title 
of the Paolella property.  A subsequent property condemnation pro-
ceeding was initiated and just compensation was to be determined for 
the government’s taking of the Paolella property.6  At issue was the 
amount sought by the Plaintiffs as just compensation.7  The Plaintiffs 
alleged that the restrictions on their property, imposed by the State’s 
 
1 In re City of New York, No. 4018/07, 2012 WL 1676889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012). 




6 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *1-2; see id. at *2 (explaining how to cal-
culate “just compensation” owed to property owners where they successfully show there was 
a “regulatory taking” by the state). 
7 Id. at *1. 
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Freshwater Wetlands regulations, constituted a regulatory taking and 
that the State failed to provide the Plaintiffs with just compensation, 
in violation of Article I, section 7(a),8 of the New York State Consti-
tution.9 
Using the per se doctrine, the City argued that the property’s 
economic value was not completely destroyed because there was 
some demand for wetlands in the area.10  Hence, the court decided 
that the regulation did not constitute a taking under the per se doc-
trine because the Plaintiffs did not suffer a total loss in value in the 
property.11  While the Plaintiffs’ claim failed under the per se doc-
trine, it survived under the ad hoc doctrine.12  As set forth in Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,13 to determine a regulatory 
taking under the ad hoc doctrine, the court balances three essential 
factors: “(1) ‘[t]he economic impact of the government’s regulation 
on the claimant,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character 
of the governmental action.’ ”14  Under this approach, the court must 
balance each factor and make a determination based upon the extent 
of the economic impact of the government’s regulation and the de-
gree of interference the regulation has on the claimant’s property in-
terests.15 
In assessing the first factor, the character or nature of the gov-
ernmental action, the court considered whether the regulation 
“amount[ed] to a physical invasion or [whether it] merely affect[ed] 
property interests to promote the common good.”16  The court found 
that the wetlands regulations provided no benefit to the restricted 
property owner, even though they did “provide a general public bene-
fit.”17  Additionally, the regulation failed to benefit any owners of 
 
8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, §7(a) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”). 
9 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *1. 
10 Id. at *2-3. 
11 Id. at *3. 
12 Id. at *3-4. 
13 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
14 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *3 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
15 Id. at *4 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005)). 
16 Id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539). 
17 Id. 
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property adjacent to the wetlands.18  Instead, the restriction dispropor-
tionately burdened a limited group of people, owners of wetlands.19  
Further, the City failed to explain how the restrictions would promote 
the common good.20  Of more importance, the court pointed out that 
“the character of the regulations” prohibited all development of the 
Plaintiffs’ property because they deprived the Plaintiffs of “any alter-
native uses that would provide a reasonable economic return.”21  Ac-
cordingly, this factor weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs because the 
government restricted the Plaintiffs’ use of the property in a way that 
did not further a public purpose. 
Next, the court addressed the extent to which the regulation 
interfered with distinct investment backed expectations maintained 
by the Plaintiffs at the time they purchased the property.22  In order 
for this factor to weigh in their favor, the Plaintiffs had to prove that 
they purchased the property with a reasonable expectation of devel-
opment or that they purchased the property for the purpose of devel-
opment.23  The Plaintiffs merely argued that they owned the property 
before the wetlands regulations were enforced and provided no in-
vestment backed expectations in the property.24  As a result, the ar-
gument failed to show evidence of any expectation the Plaintiffs had 
for the property when they purchased it.25  Therefore, the court found 
that this factor was not satisfied because the wetlands regulations 
cannot interfere with non-existent expectations in the property.26 
Finally, the court analyzed the economic impact of the wet-
lands regulation on the Plaintiffs’ inability to develop the property.27  
The court first turned to Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis.28  In 
Keystone, the United States Supreme Court established that economic 
impact was determined by evaluating the difference between the val-
ue that had been taken from the property and the value that remained 
 
18 Id. 





24 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *4. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at *4-5. 
28 Id.; Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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in the property.29  In In re City of New York, the court ultimately 
agreed with appraisal values produced by the City’s appraiser.30  The 
value of the Plaintiffs’ property with the regulation was $185,000, 
while the market value of the property, if it were not subject to the 
regulation, was just over one million dollars.31  Simply put, by attach-
ing the regulation to the wetland, the City caused the Plaintiffs’ prop-
erty to drop in value by eighty-two percent.32  The next inquiry was 
whether the eighty-two percent diminution in property value consti-
tuted a regulatory such that the Plaintiffs would be entitled to just 
compensation.33 
Accordingly, the court analyzed a number of federal and state 
cases where courts balanced the factors under the ad hoc doctrine, to-
gether with the diminution in property value, and found that the regu-
lations constituted regulatory takings.34  The court established that 
diminished value alone would not establish a per se taking.  Howev-
er, the diminution in property value, together with the requirement 
that the property remain vacant and be prohibited from any produc-
tive use would establish a regulatory taking that would require just 
compensation.35  The court reasoned that the eighty-two percent dim-
inution in Plaintiff’s property value, together with the regulation’s re-
quirement that the property remain vacant, would deny the Plaintiffs 
“any productive use of the property” and would likely result in a suc-
cessful regulatory takings claim.36  Although an 82% diminution in 
value was enough to constitute a taking in this case, state and federal 
courts have never explicitly established a bright line percentage in 
loss necessary to establish a taking.  The question, therefore, must 
turn on whether a particular diminution percentage can establish a 
taking. 
 
29 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. 





35 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *6. 
36 Id. 
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II. PROTECTING ECONOMIC RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE 
Courts have the authority to decide whether the government 
acquired private property for a public use.37  Initially, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause applied only to the federal govern-
ment.  The United States Supreme Court, in Barron v. Mayor of Bal-
timore,38 dismissed a takings claim, reasoning that the Takings 
Clause did not apply to the states because it was developed in re-
sponse to fears of abuse by the federal government.39  The Court in 
Penn Central established that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
was “made applicable to the [s]tates through [incorporation of the 
Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment.”40  A state’s 
power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of the state’s police 
power to protect its public “health, safety, and general welfare.”41 
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, private 
property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”42  The first requirement in the Takings Clause is that the private 
property must “be taken for public use,” or public purpose.43  Public 
use was defined as “the use which the public [may] freely . . . enter 
upon . . . under terms common to all, [and] the right to use by the 
public where everyone has the right to share in its benefits.”44  Under 
the rational basis test, public purpose means that there must be a rea-
sonable relationship between the taking and the purpose for the tak-
ing.45  The court examines (1) whether the taking advances a legiti-
 
37 D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1312 (2010). 
38 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
39 Id. at 250-51 (“[T]he [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution, declaring that private 
property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a 
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not appli-
cable to the legislation of the states.”). 
40 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122 (citing Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)). 
41 N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1936) (finding that if “the pub-
lic health, safety, or general welfare” of the state is threatened, the government has the power 
to do what is “necessary and appropriate”). 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
43 Id. 
44 Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A., C97 ALI-ABA 333, 338 
(1995). 
45 Keri Ann Kilcommons, A Survey of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence: The Impact 
of Del Monte Dunes on Nollan, Dolan, Agins, and Lucas, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 532, 540 
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mate public purpose, such as protecting the public health, safety, or 
general welfare; (2) whether the taking reasonably relates to that le-
gitimate public purpose; and (3) whether the taking interferes with 
the landowner’s investment-based expectations.46  Public use also en-
compasses any public advantage, including urban renewal, redevel-
opment of commercial areas, removal of undesirable living condi-
tions, and revitalization of the economic community.47 
The second requirement of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause is just compensation.  Just compensation is made when the 
landowner is paid the reasonable value of the property for the tak-
ing.48  Usually, fair market value is used to determine the reasonable 
value.49  While there is no set formula for determining just compensa-
tion for a taking, it is usually determined “by comparing the property 
[subject to the taking] with recent sale prices for similar property in 
the same area.”50  The purpose of just compensation is to remedy a 
loss to the landowner for the government’s encroachment on the 
landowner’s property rights.51  Due process guarantees that hearings 
will be held to determine the amount of compensation, but does not 
require a trial by jury.52  Unlike most jurisdictions that allow a trial 
by jury, either at the outset or after an appointed commissioner has 
already decided the case, New York courts hold these hearings with-
out a jury.53 
While the judicial process differs among the states, the sub-
stantive law on the types of takings has remained the same.  The 
United States Supreme Court has long recognized two types of tak-
ings: physical takings and regulatory takings.54  A typical physical 
 
(2001). 
46 Id. at 541 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S. 
687, 702 (1999)). 
47 Searles, supra note 44, at 341 (quoting People ex rel. Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 
920-21 (Ill. 1977)). 
48 Id. at 344. 
49 Id. at 344-45. 
50 Id. at 344. 
51 Id. 
52 Searles, supra note 44, at 356. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (con-
cluding that a cable television line, notwithstanding its minor occupation of property, consti-
tuted a physical taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (reasoning that 
a coastal protection law, preventing the landowner from building houses, was a regulatory 
taking). 
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taking “is a direct government appropriation . . . of private property” 
that must be compensated.55  A regulatory taking occurs when the 
government “goes too far” in regulating the use of property so that it 
becomes onerous to the landowner.56  A regulatory taking may also 
occur if the governmental regulation strips the property of “all eco-
nomically beneficial us[e].”57  The government need not pay com-
pensation for regulating the use of property; compensation is required 
only if the regulation constitutes a regulatory taking.58 
The following case note focuses on regulatory takings and 
evaluates the different approaches used in federal and state courts.  
Specifically, it will focus on weighing the governmental regulation’s 
economic impact on the property’s remaining use and value under the 
ad hoc approach.  Additionally, this case note will discuss the signifi-
cance of federal and subsequent state court decisions made in In re 
City of New York.  Finally, this note will examine the policy issues 
involving the absence of a bright-line rule for evaluating a taking 
based on a regulation’s impact on the remaining economic value of 
property. 
III. FEDERAL PRECEDENT 
The seminal case establishing the test for a regulatory taking 
was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.59  The issue in Pennsylvania 
Coal was whether, under the Kohler Act, the government could take 
away Pennsylvania Coal Company’s rights to mine their own proper-
ty.60  The Kohler Act prohibited “the mining of anthracite coal in 
such a way . . . [that] cause[d] the subsidence of” residential struc-
 
55 Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes 
Taking of Property Requiring Compensation Under Takings clause of Fifth Amendment to 
United States Constitution—Supreme Court Cases, 10 A.L.R. FED. 2d 231 (2006). 
56 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[R]egulation may be . . . so onerous that its ef-
fect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster . . . .”)). 
57 Id. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (“[W]here the government merely 
regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if considerations such as the 
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of 
the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a 
burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.”). 
59 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
60 Id. at 412 (pointing out that the coal company owned both the subsurface property and 
the surface property). 
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tures, unless the surface was owned by the same owner of the under-
lying coal.61  The Court concluded that enforcement of the Kohler 
Act was a regulatory taking that required just compensation because 
the government had extended its police power “too far.”62  It rea-
soned that the Act deprived the plaintiff of all previously existing 
property interests.63  This total deprivation was tantamount to a per-
manent physical invasion, as if the government was taking away all 
of the coal from the plaintiff.64  Thus, as a result of the Act, the eco-
nomic impact and interference with the property owner’s expectation 
to generate income was substantially affected.65  The private property 
was valuable because the plaintiff was entitled to mine and profit 
from the subsurface coal.66  Enforcement of the regulation against 
Pennsylvania Coal Company was equivalent to destroying the proper-
ty and depriving the owners of any use of the property for which it 
was acquired.67  The Court also found that because the property was 
privately owned, the Act could not be sustained because the private 
act of mining resulted in no interference with the public interest.68 
More than half a decade after Pennsylvania Coal, the Su-
preme Court recognized regulatory takings under an ad hoc approach.  
The United States Supreme Court, in Penn Central, addressed the is-
sue of whether a New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, which 
placed restrictions on the development of individual historic land-
marks, constituted a taking, and thus, required the payment of just 
compensation.69  In Penn Central, the plaintiffs sued the defendant 
for denying their application to construct a fifty-five-story expansion 
on top of Grand Central Terminal and a fifty-three-story expansion 
that required tearing down a part of the terminal.70  The trial court 
granted an injunction to the plaintiffs, barring the defendant from im-
 
61 Id. at 412-13. 
62 Id. at 415-16. 
63 Id. at 413. 
64 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (specifying that when a regulation becomes so on-
erous, the government must exercise eminent domain and just compensation to constitution-
ally enforce the regulation). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 414. 
67 Id. at 415. 
68 Id. at 413-14 (“A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance . . . .  The 
damage is not common or public . . . .  [T]he surface is owned by the owner of the coal.”). 
69 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107. 
70 Id. at 116-17. 
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peding the plaintiffs’ construction of any structure above the termi-
nal.71  The trial court also awarded the plaintiffs declaratory relief of 
damages for the time during which the plaintiffs were prevented from 
constructing a building.72  Defendant appealed the judgment and the 
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed, holding that 
the Landmarks Preservation Law was instituted for the public pur-
pose of protecting landmarks.73  The plaintiffs appealed and the New 
York Court of Appeals held that there was no taking, in part, because 
the landmark regulation permitted the terminal continue being used 
as a terminal, the plaintiffs failed to show they could not earn a rea-
sonable return on their investment in the terminal, and the develop-
ment rights above the terminal remained valuable to the plaintiffs if 
they developed a suitable construction plan similar to plans devel-
oped by nearby office buildings.74  On appeal, the United States Su-
preme Court reviewed all of the factual inquiries and applied the 
Penn Central factors to determine whether there was a regulatory tak-
ing under the Fifth Amendment.75  Those factors included the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the plaintiffs, the extent of the reg-
ulation’s interference with the plaintiffs’ “distinct investment-backed 
expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”76  Be-
cause there is no formula for determining when a governmental regu-
lation goes “too far,” and thus constitutes a taking, courts consider 
the facts on a case by case basis. 
First, the Court reviewed the character of the regulation.77  
The regulation was enacted to “enhance the quality of life by preserv-
ing the character and desirable aesthetic features of [the] city.”78  The 
Court indicated that preservation of specific structures and areas with 
historic significance was a permissible governmental goal.79  It re-
jected the plaintiffs’ argument that any regulation imposed on indi-
vidual landmarks constitutes a taking, requiring just compensation.80  
 
71 Id. at 119. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 121-22. 
75 Id. at 123. 
76 Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
77 Id. at 128-29. 
78 Id. 
79 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 108, 129. 
80 Id. at 131. 
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The Court reasoned that “preservation of landmarks benefits all New 
York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving 
the quality of life in the city as a whole.”81  Second, the Court found 
that the regulation did not interfere with the plaintiffs’ distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations in the property because Grand Central 
Terminal’s “designation as a landmark” permitted its continued use 
“as a railroad terminal [with] office space and concessions.”82  The 
plaintiffs were still able to obtain a reasonable return on their invest-
ment even where the terminal remained a railroad terminal.83 
Lastly, the Court weighed the economic value of the property.  
The plaintiffs argued that they could no longer effectively use the 
space above the terminal and that, as a result, the regulation dimin-
ished the profits that would have been derived from the construction 
of the fifty-five-story office building.84  The Court found, however, 
that a reduction in property value alone could not establish a taking.85  
It also found that the economic impact of the regulation was minimal 
because the plaintiffs could still build a structure above the termi-
nal.86  Therefore, the plaintiffs’ possible profits were not completely 
diminished.87  The defendant merely denied the plaintiffs’ request to 
construct a fifty-five-story structure because it could damage the 
character of the Terminal.88  Further, the Court pointed out that the 
plaintiffs also retained its pre-existing air rights, which could be 
transferred for a valuable amount.89  After weighing all three factors, 
the Court held that the defendant’s Landmarks Preservation Law was 
not a regulatory taking of the plaintiffs’ property.90 
The Supreme Court later recognized the per se approach, in 
which an automatic regulatory taking could be established under par-
ticular circumstances.  This approach was established in Lucas v. 
 
81 Id. 134. 
82 Id. at 136. 
83 Id. 
84 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136. 
85 Id. at 131. 
86 Id. at 137. 
87 Id. at 136-37 (suggesting that the Commission did not prohibit any type of construction 
above the terminal). 
88 Id. 
89 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
90 Id. at 138. 
10
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South Carolina Coastal Council.91  In Lucas, the plaintiff bought two 
beachfront lots in 1986 with the purpose of building residential units 
on those two lots.92  The Beachfront Management Act was enacted in 
1988, and barred plaintiff from building any type of permanent habit-
able structures on those two parcels.93  The Court held that the regula-
tion completely destroyed the plaintiff’s property value and denied 
him all economically beneficial and productive use in his property.94  
It reasoned that when the landowner sacrifices “all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good,” thus leaving the 
land economically idle, the landowner has suffered a taking.95 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,96 the Court rejected the ad hoc ap-
proach and instead employed a rough proportionality test.97  Under 
this test, where the government creates a regulation that requires a 
property owner to dedicate his property to governmental use, the 
government must present evidence that the loss to the owner is 
roughly proportionate to the public interest served by the regulation.98  
If the government fails to make this “sort of individualized determi-
nation that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent 
to the impact of the proposed development,” then the government has 
not met its burden and a taking is found.99  The Court held that the 
City failed to make an individualized determination for a policy to 
support the pathway and floodplain dedications.100  It reasoned, spe-
cifically, that the City failed to make any findings that a bicycle-
pedestrian pathway would resolve traffic congestion.101  The Court 
further reasoned that there was no reasonable relationship between 
the city’s floodplain easement and the landowner’s proposed devel-
opment because the proposed development would not encroach on 
any of the City’s existing space.102  The heightened scrutiny under the 
 
91 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
92 Id. at 1006-07. 
93 Id. at 1007. 
94 Id. at 1029. 
95 Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).  The Court points out that this per se rule applies ab-
sent long-standing common law or nuisance statute.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30. 
96 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
97 Id. at 389. 
98 Id. at 389-90. 
99 Id. at 391. 
100 Id. 
101 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395. 
102 Id. at 394. 
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rough proportionality test forces local governments to “prepare de-
tailed research reports and present complex calculations [and] bear 
heavy costs in preparing such detailed reports.”103 
More recently, the Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.104 
recognized two approaches that a challenge against a governmental 
regulation as a regulatory taking could be made.105  The per se theory 
established by Lucas may be used when a governmental regulation 
completely deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial” use of 
the property.106  The ad hoc theory, established by Penn Central, ap-
plies when a governmental regulation does not completely deprive an 
owner of all economically beneficial use of the property, but instead 
allows a court to evaluate the three Penn Central factors to determine 
whether the governmental regulation effects a regulatory taking re-
quiring just compensation.107 
Before 1815, only eight states had adopted takings clauses, 
and, as a result, there was a scarcity of cases interpreting state takings 
clauses.108  Today, many states have adopted the principals of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and most state takings claus-
es now closely paralleled the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.109  
New York, specifically, has consistently used both the ad hoc cate-
gorical approach and the per se rule, found in the respective paradig-
matic takings clause cases, Penn Central and Lucas.110 
 
103 Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative And Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 244-45 (2000). 
104 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
105 Id. at 548. 
106 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
107 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (specifying the three factors to be the economic impact of 
the regulation, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of governmental action); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 
(pointing out that in the absence of any set formula, the Penn Central factors are used to 
evaluate regulatory takings claims). 
108 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND 
WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 106-07 (U.S. Government Printing Office 
1973); Nicole Garnett, No Taking Without A Touching: Questions from an Armchair 
Originalist, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761, 773 (2008). 
109 Garnett, supra note 108, at 774. 
110 Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from the “Rule of 
Law”, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 380-81 (1998). 
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IV. NEW YORK STATE PRECEDENT 
New York courts have often adopted the ad hoc approach to 
determine whether governmental regulations constituted regulatory 
takings.  In addition, the New York Constitution allows regulatory 
takings if they are made with just compensation.111  New York courts 
have consistently explained that in order for a landowner to success-
fully establish a regulatory taking, he must show that the governmen-
tal regulation barred him from using his property for the purpose for 
which it was acquired.112  This resembles the Penn Central ad hoc 
approach based upon reasonable investment-backed expectations in 
the property.  To satisfy this burden, the landowner must provide de-
tailed evidence of the economic return that he or she expected from 
his projected usage of the land.113  Because the United States Su-
preme Court has not set a bright line rule for evaluating the regula-
tion’s economic impact on the property, New York state courts weigh 
heavily on the property’s remaining economic uses.  That is not to 
say that New York courts do not consider the diminution in value of 
the property. 
Courts in New York may sometimes give greater weight to 
diminution in property value than they give to possible economic us-
es.  In Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State,114 the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York State Supreme Court held that the State’s con-
demnation of plaintiff’s property under the New York State Tidal 
Wetlands Act could be successfully challenged as a regulatory tak-
ing.115  Plaintiff owned 5.91 acres of land classified as tidal wet-
 
111 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (providing in pertinent part: “Private property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation.”). 
112 De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1986) (suggesting that once the 
town denies, with prejudice, the landowner’s request for a permit to develop his property 
into single-family residences, the regulation then precludes the landowner from using his 
land for the purpose for which it was acquired); Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 
(N.Y. 1979) (explaining that in determining whether a regulation barred the landowner from 
using his land for the purpose for which it was purchased, courts consider evidence of the 
property’s value, purchase price, the uses for which it may have been acquired, or the possi-
ble gains from permitted uses). 
113 Spears, 397 N.E.2d at 1308; see also De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d at 885 (“[T]he property 
owner must show by ‘dollar and cents’ evidence that under no use permitted by the regula-
tion under attack would the properties be capable of producing a reasonable economic return 
. . . .”). 
114 497 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 1984). 
115 Id. at 986. 
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lands.116  The State enacted the Tidal Wetlands Act,117 which pro-
scribed residential use of the property, and subsequently appropriated 
the plaintiff’s property for environmental purposes.118  Consequently, 
the plaintiffs sued the State for compensation for the regulatory tak-
ing.  The Appellate Division agreed that, under the Tidal Wetlands 
Act, the “highest and best use” of the property was recreational at 
most.119 
The ‘diminution in property’ value was used by the court, in 
tandem with the impact on the economic use of the property, to de-
termine whether a regulatory taking existed.  The court agreed that, 
with the regulation intact, the property’s value was worth $7,400.120  
Conversely, without the regulation, the property would be worth 
about $53,781.121  The regulation reduced plaintiff’s property value 
by 86% and thus deprived plaintiff of all financially rewarding uses 
of the property by restricting it to recreational usage.122  Under these 
circumstances, the 86% diminution in property value and the regula-
tion’s limit on the property to be used solely for recreational purposes 
provided a reasonable probability that there would likely be a suc-
cessful constitutional challenge to the regulation as a regulatory tak-
ing.123 
In Friedenburg v. New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation,124 the court reviewed the regulation’s effect on 
the property’s economic value in tandem with its effect on the prop-
erty’s economic use.  The plaintiffs challenged the Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) wetlands regulations, which 
proscribed utilization of the waterfront property, as a regulatory tak-
ing which required just compensation.125  The 2.5-acre parcel was 
purchased in 1962, and passed to the owner’s estate, the plaintiffs, in 
 
116 Id. at 985. 
117 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 661.1 (1977). 
118 Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (claiming that the drainage on the wet-
lands was poor, that mosquito ditches infested area, and tidal flow was present under or 
around the property). 
119 Id. at 990 (stating that it based this conclusion on the State’s appraiser who valued the 
property at $7,400 according to the restrictions of the Tidal Wetlands Act). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 991. 
122 Id. at 992. 
123 Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 992. 
124 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 2003). 
125 Id. at 453. 
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1973.126  The plaintiffs were denied a permit to construct a single-
family residence multiple times.  In 1989 the Village of Southampton 
adopted the DEC’s wetlands regulations, which restricted any devel-
opment of the property.127  Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought suit 
against the DEC, and requested permission for the building; in the al-
ternative, the plaintiffs sought payment for a violation of the Takings 
Clause.128  The New York Appellate Division applied the ad hoc fac-
tors pursuant to Penn Central, and held that the restrictions constitut-
ed a regulatory taking.129  It reasoned that the property value was re-
duced by 95%, and the property could no longer be used for the 
purpose for which it was purchased because the regulations required 
that the property be left in its natural state.130 
Unlike the court in Friendenburg, some courts do not find a 
reduction in property value to be a compelling factor.  In Gazza v. 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,131 a reg-
ulatory takings issue arose when the landowner purchased property 
knowing that it had been designated as protected tidal wetlands, and 
was denied a building permit for a residence.132  The court examined 
the facts under the ad hoc approach and held that the regulation did 
not constitute a taking.133  It then reasoned that there was no invest-
ment-backed interest of the landowner in building a house at the time 
he purchased the property, because he knew the property was desig-





129 Friedenburg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (stating that the three factors used to determine 
whether there was a regulatory taking are “the economic impact of the regulation, the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and 
the character of governmental action”); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that 
the character of the government action considers whether such action is a physical invasion 
by the government or an interference with a public purpose such that it arises from a public 
program “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.”). 
130 Friedenburg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 459, 461 (explaining that the court agrees with the ap-
praiser’s detailed findings that although the DEC would permit certain activities on the wet-
lands, those same activities would not be approved by the Southampton Trustees, the South-
ampton Zoning Board of Appeals, and the Village Board). 
131 679 N.E.2d 1035 (1997). 
132 Id. at 1036. 
133 Id. at 1041-42, 1043. 
134 Id. at 1037, 1042. 
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had not been destroyed by the regulation because the property could 
be used for recreational purposes.135  A part of the court’s ad hoc 
analysis on the economic viability of the property was the diminution 
in property value.  Although neither party presented this argument, 
the court nonetheless specified that diminution in property value is 
generally insufficient to establish a taking, regardless of the value.136 
Time and again, many cases in New York have focused on the 
economic use of the property rather than the diminished property val-
ue.137  The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in 
Putnam County National Bank v. City of New York,138 applied Penn 
Central’s ad hoc approach and held that there was no regulatory tak-
ing, because the economic impact on the plaintiff’s property was in-
sufficient to outweigh the City’s enforcement of the Watershed Regu-
lations.139  Plaintiff acquired the property for the purpose of dividing 
it into thirty-six lots and operating a central sewage system.140  The 
City then enacted the Watershed Regulations and revoked plaintiff’s 
permit for a central sewage system.141  Subsequently, the plaintiff ob-
tained a permit for an alternate proposal, where the property would be 
divided into seventeen lots and operates with subsurface septic sys-
tems.142  The plaintiff then sold the property for $1.4 million, and al-
leged the property value was reduced by 80% due to the regula-
tions.143  The 80% diminution in value had no impact on the court’s 
decision, because the plaintiff was nevertheless permitted to signifi-
cantly develop the property and obtain a reasonable economic re-
turn.144  The court reasoned that a regulation could not be rendered a 
taking, even if it “substantially reduced” the property value or “de-
prive[d] the property of its most beneficial use,” so long as the land 
was capable of producing a reasonable return in light of the regula-
 
135 Id. at 1042 (stating that “a regulation [that] ‘deprives the property of its most beneficial 
use does not render it unconstitutional.’ ” (quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594)). 
136 Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1042. 
137 For cases that have put an overwhelming focus on the “economic use” Penn Central 
factor see Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 
2007), and De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d 879, Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d 983. 
138 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2007). 
139 Id. at 663. 
140 Id. at 662. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 662. 
144 Id. at 663. 
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tion.145 
In 2007, the court in In re City of New York concluded that 
there was a regulatory taking.146  The court took the ad hoc approach 
and weighed the Penn Central factors.147  Specifically, when it evalu-
ated one of the factors— the economic impact of the regulation on 
the property— it considered both the remaining economic use and the 
diminution in the economic value.148  Together, the regulation prohib-
iting structural development and the 82% reduction in property value 
presented a successful regulatory takings claim.149  Thus, the court 
awarded the Plaintiffs $810,000 as a “just compensation” award un-
der the regulatory Takings Clause in the New York Constitution, 
which also satisfied the requirements of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.150  Although the Penn Central factors were created 
to analyze federal takings claims, In re City of New York’s use of the 
same factors shows that the New York State Constitution’s Takings 
Clause is comparable to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Furthermore, the absence of a specifically established percentage of 
diminution in the value of property allowed this court to apply and 
balance the other Penn Central factors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the value of Plaintiffs’ Staten Island property 
appeared completely diminished because the government regulation 
forced the Plaintiffs to leave the property vacant.  If the court found 
the property completely diminished, the court would have applied the 
per se analysis under Lucas.151  However, the court in In re City of 
New York utilized an ad hoc approach, pursuant to Penn Central, be-
cause the Plaintiffs’ property value was not completely destroyed, 
like the property in Lucas.152  Both the Plaintiffs and the City agreed 
 
145 Id.; De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d at 885 (pointing out that the landowner has the burden of 
showing the regulation prohibited any use of the land that would be “capable of producing a 
reasonable return”). 
146 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *6. 
147 Id. at *3. 
148 Id. at *4. 
149 Id. at *6. 
150 Id. at *1, *11. 
151 In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *2. 
152 Id. at *3. 
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that the land retained economic value because they found “compara-
ble sales [where] local Staten Island market investors [were] willing 
to purchase properties that [prohibited development] because of wet-
lands regulations.”153  When the court reached its discussion on the 
regulation’s economic impact on the Paollelas, it provided a lengthy 
analysis of the remaining economic use of the property and the prop-
erty value diminution as a percentage.  Once the court found that 
there was an 82% reduction in value, this value was taken together 
with the other factors to find that a regulatory taking existed.154 
Regulatory takings permit both federal and state courts to ap-
ply the appropriate factors in determining whether a regulation 
should be invalidated.  Federal courts employ the proper factors for 
the per se approach and ad hoc approach, respectively.  A regulatory 
taking per se requires the regulation to have caused the landowner to 
be deprived of all economically beneficial use of the subject property.  
Under the ad hoc approach, the court balances the economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant, the regulation’s interference with 
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action, to determine the degree of interference the 
regulation has on the landowner’s use of the subject property. 
State courts have the freedom to interpret the precedents set 
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Because there is no bright-line rule 
as to how to balance the regulation’s economic impact on the land-
owner’s property, state courts can factor in the reduction of the prop-
erty value in terms of a given percentage.  The absence of a bright-
line rule may have policy benefits and detriments.  In Florida Rock 
Industries, Inc. v. United States,155 the United States Court of Appeals 
examined some of these pros and cons.156  First, the need for a speci-
fied rule stems from the difficulty in determining whether a particular 
reduced value in property should justify compensation for a taking.157  
The problem with establishing such a rule would be that the govern-
ment would have to make a payment every time it exercised its police 
power.158  While courts have the power to manipulate the magnitude 
 
153 Id. at *2. 
154 Id. at *6. 
155 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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of the regulation’s economic impact on the property owner, both the 
U.S. Constitution and New York State Constitution require that if 
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